La colusión en el contexto de los algoritmos.

  1. Stella SOLERNOU SANZ 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Deusto (Bilbao)
Journal:
Revista de Estudios Europeos

ISSN: 1132-7170 2530-9854

Year of publication: 2021

Issue Title: Retos jurídicos en los mercados digitales

Issue: 78

Pages: 138-153

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista de Estudios Europeos

Abstract

A great level of transparency, resulting from data sharing, combined with use of algorithms may lead to mutual control of prices or production control by competitors. Algorithms eliminate elements of spontaneity in market and may result in supracompetitive prices. But the collusive effect can also occur even if economic operators do not have this intention. Not always there is an express or implied agreement that fits within the concept of "restriction of competition" as traditionally delimited by European case law in the sense that companies agree to eliminate their independence or freedom to defining their business strategy. In these cases, there may not even have been any concerted practice. In this regard, it unilaterally provokes collusion (higher prices). This makes it difficult to apply article 101 TFEU, since it requires some kind of concerted practice involving the idea of agreement. It is necessary to analyze whether it is possible to reinterpret the rule in such a way as to include the phenomenon of tacit collusion.