Optimización de la gestión de objetivos comerciales en el sector asegurador

  1. TURRADO GARCÍA, FERNANDO
Dirixida por:
  1. Ana Lucila Sandoval Orozco Director
  2. Luis Javier García Villalba Director

Universidade de defensa: Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Fecha de defensa: 16 de xuño de 2023

Tribunal:
  1. Antonio José Heras Martínez Presidente/a
  2. José Luis Vilar Zanón Secretario/a
  3. Joseba Iñaki de la Peña Esteban Vogal
  4. Xavier Vilasís-Cardona Vogal
  5. José Garrido Manso Vogal

Tipo: Tese

Resumo

The problem known as agency theory, or the agent-principal problem, is a problem widely known and studied from an economic perspective in which it is studied how an entity called principal delegates part of its activity to another entity known as an agent in exchange for pre-established financial compensation. Thus, in this context, a conflict of interes naaturally arises between the principal's own interests and those of the agent, since the agent is autonomous in his decision-making and the principal can only influence these decisions through the contract that regulates their relationship.The design of the remuneration mechnisms (commissions and incentives), a fundamental part of the contract between both entities, is carried out under quite complex conditions that make the work of the principal difficult when designing it: there is asymmetry in the information since the principal does not knows the internal strategy of the agent or the effort (amount of work that is capable of developing) and the utility of some actions is not known in the short term or is immediate (incentives are calculated periodically) so the agent does not know the "real return" of those actions when making the decisions. AS an added difficulty due to the peculiarities of the insurance sector, the main variables that condition decision-making (for example, the premiun of the policies contracted by the agent on bejalf of the insurance company or the effort required to manage the undertaking of a policy) are stochastic variables...